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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law—Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Adher-
ence to Self-enacted Procedural Rules.—Elmo Div. of Drive-X Co. v.
Dixon. 1—In 1952, Rule V(f) of the Federal Trade Commission's Rules
of Practice provided for a reopening procedure whereby the Commission could
set aside a consent settlement only after finding a change of law or fact, or
that the public interest required. This rule was incorporated in a consent
settlement with appellant. Subsequently, the Commission instituted a new
complaint against appellant which dealt with the same matters as the 1952
consent settlement. Appellant claimed that by ignoring Rule V(f), the Com-
mission had caused substantial prejudice to its business and reputation and
would subject it to a full-scale trial twice on the same charges. It sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in a federal district court. The court dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, HELD: Reversed. The complaint
states a claim that the district court must entertain. Incorporation of the
rule into the consent decree gives rise to an enforceable right in the appellant
to require the Commission to abide by the rule. Moreover, the institution by
an agency of rules governing procedure may prevent deviation from them
as long as they remain in effect.
Both procedural and substantive rules are properly made by an indepen-
dent agency within the limits set by statute. The distinction between the two
types of rules is one of how as versus what.2 It is only the how that concerns
us here. These rules fill in the procedural spaces purposely left by congres-
sional legislation, facilitating and regularizing procedure in fields where acts
of a given nature constantly recur .a
When these rules are applied in a role essentially judicial in nature, re-
viewing courts have often held agencies to a species of equitable estoppel—
and have produced a result similiar to that attained under res judicata prin-
ciples.4 On occasion, however, courts have chosen not to hold an administrator
to his previously chosen standard. 5
 In general, the line has been drawn with
1 348 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2 Glaser, Administrative Procedure 11 (1941).
a Many jurists have spoken out on the importance of procedure. Mr. Justice
Douglas: "It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule
by law and rule by whim or caprice." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951). "The history of American freedom is, in no small measure,
the history of procedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945). Mr. Justice
Jackson: "Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty."
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rd. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953). Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: "The history of liberty has largely been the history of procedural safe-
guards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
4
 United States ex rel. Ohm v. Perkins, 79 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1935); Cooper, Ad-
ministrative Agencies and the Courts 242 (1951). The agencies themselves seem to
recognize that a prior determination will not be reversed to the detriment of an indi-
vidual who fairly relied on an earlier ruling. See Baltimore Transit Co., 47 N.L.R.B.
109 (1943).
5
 United States ex rd. Minuto v—Reimer, 83 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936); Board of
Tax Appeals v. United States ex rel. Shults Bread Co., 37 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1929);
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a crooked ruler, as are most lines that must come between competing interests.
In every case, as in the present, the public has an interest in effective adminis-
tration, while the individual wishes to be free from repeated litigation.°
Only a few cases during the nineteenth century dealt with the question
of whether an agency was required to follow its procedural rules. All were
of the opinion that an agency could ignore, modify, or repeal any regulation
or custom at will, as long as no valuable property right was impaired.? To
determine whether such a right had been impaired, the reasoning and policy
which presumably led the administrator to adopt the procedure was closely
scrutinized by the courts.° As late as the early 1930's it was believed that
flexibility of procedure—especially when the proceedings were being con-
ducted by laymen—was desirable .°
This flexibility prompted a reaction during the' latter part of the decade.
Unchecked procedures had brought a sense of confusion into the entire ad-
ministrative process, and the elements of fairness were believed to be too
frequently absent.1 ° About 1938, spurred by an antagonism to the powers
exercised by regulatory agencies, the bar as a whole sought to impose the
strict rules of traditional judicial procedure on the agencies.il A compromise
resulted in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, section 3 of which
required publication of procedural rules in the Fe'deral Register."= The act
was passed in the hope of regularizing procedure, and section 3 in particular
was meant to enable practitioners before the commissions to become familiar
with the rules that would govern proceedings. Nowhere in the act, however,
is there a requirement that an administrator always follow the rules currently
in effect, in fact, finding the current rules among the thousands of pages of
the Federal Register is thought to be an impossible task by many who have
attempted to do so." Therefore, it cannot be said that the act in any way
answers the question dealt with here.
Emil Denemark, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 474 (1936); System Fed'n No. 6 v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 2 N.R.A.B. 178 (1937); Baitinger,Elec. Co. v. Forbes, 170 Misc. 589, 10 N.Y.S.2d
924 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Gillis v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 105.Pa. Super, 389, 161 Atl. 563
(1932); cf. Consumers Power Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1940).
6 Cooper, op. cit. supra note 4, at 247.
7
 Bernard v. Ashley, 3 Fed. Cas. 272 (No. 1346) (C.C.D. Ark. 1853), aff'd, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 43 (1855).
8 Germania Iron Co. v. James, 89 Fed. 811 (8th Cir. 1898).
9
 Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect 15 (1960).
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 16.
12
 Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a)(2), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §
1002(a)(2) (1964). The section states:
Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register
. . . (2) statements of the general course and method by which its functions
are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all
formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations. . .
Concerning the section, Representative Walter of Pennsylvania noted during
debate of the bill: "[T]he public information requirements of section 3 are among the
most important and useful provisions of the bill." Administrative Procedure Act, 1944-
46, Legislative History 356 (1949).
13 Vanderbilt, Administrative Procedure: Shall Rules Before the Agencies Be
Uniform?, 34 A.B.A.J: 896 (1948). The Chief Justice noted:
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Lack of statutory authority has not deterred the judiciary from solving
the problem on its own. When adherence is to be enforced, however, courts
of today act on grounds different from the former valuable property right
basis. A rule is mandatory, according to a modern court, because it has "the
force and effect of law," 14 while customs also call for compulsory conduct in
order to insure a uniformity of treatment to the general public.' 5 A 1954
Suprethe Court opinion states that as long as a procedural rule remains in
effect, it cannot be sidestepped.'" In 1957, the Court noted that as long as
regulations remain unchanged, proceeding without regard to them will not be
allowed.' 7 In 1959, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and three
other justices, wrote:
An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by
which it professes its action to be judged. . . . Accordingly, if dis-
missal from employment is based on a defined procedure even
though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency,
that procedure must be scrupulously observed. . . This judicially
evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if
I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall
perish with that sword." (Emphasis added.)
These cases, in addition to the present decision, would seem to settle the
issue. Yet there are those cases which ignore the agency's disregard of its
For when the procedures of nearly a hundred federal agencies are not only
meaninglessly diverse but changed week by week, enlightened only by the
feeble glow of the Federal Register, clients and lawyers alike can have only
an imperfect knowledge and no practical certainty of the ways of federal regula-
tory agencies.
Id. at 898.
14 Blackly & Oatman, Federal Regulatory Action and Control 65 (1940). See
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1944); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911);
Sibray v. United States ex rel. Plichta, 282 Fed. 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1922) ; United States
ex rel. Chin Fook Wab v. Dunton, 288 Fed. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); Edwards v. Guthner,
106 Colo. 209, 103 P.2d 6 (1940). And see Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900),
where Mr. Justice Harlan noted:
Those who insist that such a regulating is invalid must make its invalidity so
manifest that the court has no choice except to hold that the Secretary has ex-
ceeded his authority and employed means that are not at all appropriate to the
end specified in the act of Congress.
Id. at 470.
15 But see Baintinger Elec. Co. v. Forbes, supra note 5.
16 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); see Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 151-53 (1945); United States ex rel. Bilokurnsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 155 (1923); Boske v. Comingore, supra note 14.
17 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957).
18 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1959) (citations omitted). The same
rationale appeared in an earlier Frankfurter opinion, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943):
Since the decision of the Commission was explicitly based upon the applicability
of principles of equity announced by courts, its validity must likewise be judged
on that basis. The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.
Id. at 87.
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rules, noting this to be "a mere technical defect"18
 which should be over-
looked because it affects no substantial right. Still other decisions are con-
sistent with the view that prejudice rather than mere departure from the
rules must be shown.2° A 1953 Eighth Circuit opinion clearly states the basis
of these cases:
It is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative
agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the
orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the
ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not
reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the
complaining party. . . . The Board acts in the public interest and
not in vindication of private rights . . . . Its discretion is not to be
controlled at the whim of a private party... 2 1
In other words, the courts have not found it necessary or desirable to force
administrative adherence to all regulations or customs. Usually, the rule is
branded as procedural, capable of being ignored or modified as long as no
party to the proceeding is placed in a disadvantageous position. 22
 An analogy
is often drawn to the rules of courts; the quasi-judicial nature of the adminis-
trative actions and the desirability of attaining the ends of justice are stressed
to strengthen the analogy 2 8
 The rationale of the courts is not surprising in
view of the general trend away from technicalities that today marks trial
proceedings. 24
 If the courts themselves are to be freed from the minutiae of
19
 Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB; 192 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
919 (1952).
20
 Federal Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 534 (2d Cir. 1954).
21
 NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 1 764-65 (8th Cir. 1953). The
same court, in an earlier decision, NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1950),
rejected the claim that an existing administrative rule had not been followed thusly:
"[It] is a procedural rule which the Board in its discretion may apply or waive as
the facts of a given case may demand. . . The Board is not the slave of its rules."
Id. at 129.
22
 NLRB v. Grace Co., supra note 21; NLRB v. J.S. Popper, Inc., 113 F.2d 602
(3d Cir. 1940). See Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of
February 13, 1925, 35 Yale L.J. 1 (1925), where Mr. Chief Justice Taft said: "A com-
plaining litigant in the Federal courts . . . must always be ready to point to the
clause of the Federal Constitution and the statute by which he may rightly invoke
the consideration of the court." Id. at 11.
23
 NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., supra note 21.
24
 Lehman, Technical Rules .of Evidence, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1926);
McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 512 (1938); Wigmore,
Appendix to ALI Code of Evidence 112 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1940). But see Greenleaf,
Evidence 730 (16th ed. 1899).
This trend is manifested in many ways. It can be observed from the frequency
with which courts, after holding an original decision invalid, remand the case for
further consideration by the agency, rather than making a final decision, and the
tendency to treat as issues of fact what might be considered issues of law. See, e.g.,
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945). It can also be seen in the
suggestion in some cases that judicial review should not be granted except as required
by statute. See, e.g., Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297
(1943).
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rules to which they were bound in former days, equal or greater freedom for
the agencies would be a reasonably expected result.
Looking historically at the question, when courts first began to review
agency determinations, a reversal was based on faulty administrative fact-
finding. Courts were not unconsciou§ of the fact that the agencies were taking
over in areas formerly within their control; 25 and under the guise of constitu-
tional and statutory interpretation, administrative decisions were overturned
in an attempt to embarrass and undermine the new agencies. 28 Now, as a look
at the cases will show, it has become quite fashionable to give deference to
administrative fact-finding. According to one commentator, judges appear to
have simply shifted the attack upon the agencies to equitable estoppel, due
process, and other grounds of law. 27
The proponents of judicial review of procedure state that the administra-
tive tribunal has an interest in the result of cases pending before it and that
such interest often affects the fairness of the hearing. They believe that if
the agency had its way, lawyers would not be allowed to represent their
clients at hearings,28 and all determinations would be made from evidence
received off the record.29 Opponents of such review question the action of
the courts on the grounds that the administrators are just, as expert in the
procedural matters which concern their commissions—more so than the judges
sitting in review—and maintain that deference should be 'given on this as
well as on substantive fact-finding 8 0
Between the two extremes there exists at present a middle ground which
is probably the result of a realization that too rigid an application of the doc-
trine prohibiting disregard of procedural rules would encourage the tendency
of some agencies to proceed without rules or lead to rules so vague that it
would be impossible to show a violation. 81 Beyond that, control of discretion
is not typically a judicial function, nor is there proof that anything is to be
gained from favoring the discretion of a judge over that of an administrator.
The discretion which the agencies are exercising is that which was delegated
to them by the Legislature. It is the Legislature which can amend the laws
which established and which affect the agencies. It is the Legislature which
periodically passes upon the appropriation bills that provide the bureaus with
their operating funds. It is the Legislature which must give its advice and
consent on important appointees to agency positions. Therefore, according to
the middle view, the answer is that the problem is fundamentally political
and best solved by the Legislature rather than the courts. 32
The proponents of review, then, seemingly emphasizing' their suspicion
23 Landis, The Administrative Process 123 (1938).
28 Ibid.
27 Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 565 (1965).
28 Cooper, op. cit. supra note 4, at 21.
23
 Pound, Administrative Law 68-73 (1942); American Bar Ass'n, Reports of
Special Committee on Administrative Law, 64 A.B.A. Rep. 575 (1939) and 63 A.B.A.
Rep. 331, 346 (1938); see American Drug Corp. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 608' (8th Cir. 1945).
so Jaffe, op. cit. supra note 27, at 566; see Treves, Administrative Discretion and
Judicial Control, 10 Modern L. Rev. 276 (1947).
81 Cooper, op. cit. supra note 4, at 289.
32 Id. at 345.
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of agency aims, urge that it is most desirable that the courts continue to
scrutinize closely the records of administrative actions where rules have been
ignored, for hiding behind a "mere" procedural error may be a substantial
injustice. In rebuttal, from the agencies' view, it is admitted that the judiciary
has done much to discourage the ignoring of regulations and customs. While
this is not necessarily to be faulted, the nature of the administrator's duties
and the vast volume and complexity of the business which he faces require
that he retain some discretion if substantial justice is to be done. The estab-
lishment of all-embracing and uniformly applicable regulations will not insure
this. The real question should always be , whether or not due process has been
done. It is submitted that in the future an appellant should not be allowed
to avail himself of even the most flagrant disregard of procedural rules unless
he can also show that the procedural error caused him injustice."
GERALD E. FARRELL
Antitrust—Antitrust Civil Process Act—Investigation of Premerger
Activities.—United States v. Union Oil Co.'—Union Oil Co. filed d'petition
to set aside a Civil Investigative Demand issued by the Department of Justice
pursuant to the Antitrust Civil Process Act (ACPA). 2 The demand requested
documents relating to an investigation of "proposed acquisitions of fertilizer
companies by petroleum companies" for the purpose of "ascertaining whether
there is or has been a violation of" 3 Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 The dis-
83 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I, rehearing denied, 304 U.S. 23 (1938); see
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926), where Mr. Justice Stone, speaking
of due process, said:
Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice, and reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present his claim or defence, due regard being had
to the nature of the proceedings and the character of the rights which may be
affected by it.
Id. at 42.
1 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965).
2 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1311-14 (1964).
3 Part of the demand was reproduced in a footnote in the opinion, the relevant
portions of which are set forth herein:
You are hereby required to produce . . . the documentary material in your
possession, custody or control described on the attached schedule ... .
This civil investigative demand is issued pursuant to the provisions of the
Antitrust Civil Process Act .. . in the course of an inquiry for the purpose of
ascertaining whether there is or has been a violation of the provisions of Title 15
United States Code Sec. 18 [Clayton Act, Section 71 by conduct of the following
nature: The proposed acquisitions of fertilizer companies by petroleum com-
panies.
Attached was a schedule of documents:
1. Each survey, study, report or other writing prepared or used by the
corporation, its officers,' directors or employees, which refers or relates to the
maintenance or improvement of the corporation's position in the fertilizer market,
including each such document relating to any acquisition, merger, sale of assets,
or consolidation consummated or considered by the corporation.
Supra note 1, at 30 n.l.
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